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THE UNIT-OF-TIME METHOD OF COMPUTING
PAIN AND SUFFERING AS PORTRAYED
ON BLACKBOARDS AND CHARTS
BLACKBOARDS AND CHARTS AS TRIAL AIDS

We live in a nation of viewers' and it has become well established that people learn more rapidly by observing than by
listening. 2 Thus the time spent in preparation of visual evidence
and its presentation at trial has proved invaluable to juries
in finding the facts. The use of this type of evidence by plaintiffs' attorneys in recent years and the corresponding failure of
defense attorneys to use similar evidence may explain some of
the high verdicts throughout the country.3 There is no doubt
that in preparation for trial an attorney should utilize his imaginative processes and every opportunity available to prepare
to lay
this type of evidence.4 since it is more understandable
5
clients.
for
results
better
obtains
and
jurors
The visual aids most widely used in the courtroom are
blackboards and charts., Melvin Belli, a fervent advocate of
I Kilroy, Seeing Is Believing, 8 KAN. L. REV. 445 (1960). In BrownMiller Co. v. Howell, 224 Miss. 136, 79 So.2d 818 (1955), the court said
that: "The greater part of man's information and knowledge is acquired
through the eye." Id. at 149, 79 So.2d at 822.
2 Goodnow, Visual Aid in Court, 1960 A.B.A. SECT. INS. & NEG. C. L. 60.
The author also said "people absorb up to thirty three per cent more when
appeal is made to the eye as well as the ear and they retain what they hear
fifty five per cent longer." Id. See also BARLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY
IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932); Cohen, Interaction Between a Visually Perceived Simple Figure and Appropriate Verbal Label in
Recall, 24 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 2387 (1967), Hanawalt & Tarr,
The Effect of Recall Upon Recognition, 62 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 361 (1961).
3 Kilroy, supra note 1.
See M. BELLI, THE ADEQUATE AWARD (1950).
Belli says that it is apparent that the development of persuasive and novel
use of demonstrative evidence is resulting in higher verdicts and defense
attorneys are painfully aware of the efficacy of their techniques. He continues, "(blut even the call to arms of the defense attorneys is predicated
on countering these techniques on their own terms and not by resorting to
judicial strait-jacketing on the advocate's role." Id. at 73.
See also comment, Damages - Pain and Suffering - Counsel's Argument to
Jury re Amount of Award Held Improper, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 522 (1958).
4 Kilroy, supra note 1.
McCormick in5 C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §181 (1954).
dicates that charts and diagrams are so useful in giving clarity and interest
to spoken statements that it may be argued that no special control over
their admission is needed beyond the requirements for all testimony, that it
be relevant. See Kelly v. Spokance, 83 Wash. 55, 145 P. 57 (1914), where
the court said:
[Tihe practice of admitting photographs and models in evidence in all
Such evidence usually clarifies
proper cases should be encouraged.
some issue and gives the jury and the court a clearer comprehension of
the physical facts that can be obtained from the testimony of the witnesses.
Id. at 56, 145 P. at 58.
6 Bronson, Visual Aids in Jury Argument, 10 DEF. L. J. 3 (1961).
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the use of such trial aids, has not tried a case in the last several
years without the use of at least two blackboards.' He also
recommends that the trial lawyer have at least one blackboard
in his office to prepare for trial as well as to explain tactics to
clientsy The use of these trial aids has become so widespread
that some courts have even taken judicial notice thereof.9
It should be kept in mind that there is a distinction between a chart which is used in evidence and one used in argument only. 10 Evidence may be exhibited throughout the trial
where relevant, while the chart used for argumentative purposes
must be withdrawn from the jury's observation at the conclusion of the argument in which it is employed. 1 The chart used
in argument should refer only to matters which are in evidence2
or to inferences which may be reasonably drawn from evidence.
It is within the trial court's discretion to permit the use of a
blackboard or chart in aid of counsel's argument to show any
matter which counsel could state to the jury in proper argument.13 It is also within the trial court's discretion to permit
a blackboard or chart to illustrate the testimony of a witness."
Wigmore has said: "It would be folly to deny ourselves on
the witness stand those effective media of communication commonly employed at other times as a superior substitute for
words." 1"1 But even if the trial judge permits a witness to use
a blackboard during the testimony, he may later refuse to allow
its use during final argument. 16 A witness should, of course, not
7Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and The Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.
J. 284, 308 (1951).
8 Id. at 314.
9 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
10 Id.

11 Haycock v. Christie, 249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Davis v. Haldeman, 150 F. Supp. 669, (E.D. Pa. 1957); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d
82 (Fla. App. 1959) ; Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss.
403, 73 So.2d 144 (1954).
In Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955), the
court said that counsel should not allow damage figures to remain before the
jury at any time other than during argument. The court in Clark v. Hudson,
265 Ala. 630, 93 So.2d 138 (1956), refused to make a distinction between
the use of a blackboard listing damages prayed for and the use of a prepared
chart for the same purpose. The use of a prepared chart would preclude
the opposing attorney from erasing figures and replacing them with some
of his own, but this did not change its character to that of evidence as opposed to an argumentative aid. See 1 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS §§130,
133(2)

135 (1954).

12katner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959). See FourCounty Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.2d 144 (1954).
18 Ryan v. C. & D. Motor Delivery Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 18, 186 N.E.2d 156
(1962).
14 State v. Jones, 51 N.M. 141, 179 P.2d 1001 (1947).
153 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §790 (3d ed. 1940).
16 Wilson v. Hampton, Ill. App. 2d 175, 194 N.E.2d 564 (1963).
The granting or denying of permission to use a blackboard or chart and
the extent to which it may be employed rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court, Haycock v. Christie, 249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Upon timely
objection, however, the jury should be instructed that neither the chart nor
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be permitted to use a chart or diagram to illustrate his testimony in order to show an assumed condition which admissible

proof has not shown to exist in fact. 17

The chart finds its

proper use as mere illustration; that is, when it shows visually

nothing more than the jury is permitted to hear.'
The utility of employing blackboards and charts as trial
aids can be readily observed when they are used to portray

damages for pain and suffering.' 9 Such techniques are often
utilized during closing arguments, 20 a stage of trial where the
attention of the jury is critical.21 This logical nexus between
the use of such visual aids and the employment of a unit-of-time

formula for computing pain and suffering cannot be severed.2"
This view can be illustrated by the following:
In recent years the use of demonstrative evidence in the courtroom
has been highly refined, particularly by lawyers who represent
plaintiffs in personal injury litigation. The blackboard, for example, has proved very effective as a device
for making graphic
23
presentations . . . on a unit-of-time basis.
THE UNIT-OF-TIME METHOD OF COMPUTING PAIN AND SUFFERING

The standard of "certainty," or at least "reasonable certainty," is an established rule in proving damages. 2'
These
standards manifest an insistence that the jury must be furnished with some yardstick, however rudimentary, which will
argument is evidence, Miller v. Loy, 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N.E.2d 38 (1956).
'7Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sanders, 249 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. Ct. App.
1952).
I Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem. Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964). The chart contained references to what counsel considered reasonable damages and suggested figures with a total which was
in black crayon on a sheet of easel paper and displayed to the jury.
But see Caley v. Manicke, 24 11. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
19 Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961) where the
chart appeared as follows:
15 days at $100.00
$1,500.00
5/8/38 - 3/4/59 - 301 days at $25.00
7,525.00
34.73 years 12,676 days at $3.00
38,028.00
$47,053.00
The fifteen days refer to hospitalization at $100 per day. The second
line is the date from the injury to trial and the fee for treatment er
day, while the third line is the amount of days left to the plaintiff's life
expectancy. Thus the whole amount that might, at first blush look
large, is now accounted for by the sum of its parts.
Id. at 426, 122 S.E.2d at 22.
20 Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem. Hosp., 50 Il. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964), Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Braddock, 96 So.2d 127
(Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892.
21 See generally Comment, Damages -

Pain and Suffering -

Counsel's

Argument to Jury re Amount of Award Held Improper, 12 RUTGERS L. REN.
522 (1958).
22 See Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.2d
144 (1954).
23 See Introduction to Bolen, The Blackboard Jungle of Demonstrative
Evidence: View of a Defense Attorney, 48 VA. L. REv. 913 (1962).
24 Comment, The Probability of the Happening of an Event as a Test
for Awarding Damages, 28 COL. L. REv. 76 (1928). See C. MCCORMICK, The
Law of Damages §26 (1935).
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There are, however,
aid them in making their determination.,
many modifications to the rule of certainty which enable the

of certainty as an
courts, while professing a high standard
26
ideal, to avoid harsh applications of it.
One exception is that the law has no standard by which
to measure pain and suffering in money.2-

"Physical pain" and

"mental suffering" are combined together as elements of damage in personal injury litigation.28 Physical pain is an immediate reaction upon the nerves and brain provoked by some
injury to the body, while mental suffering is distress which is
not felt as being directly connected with any bodily condition. 2 Mental suffering is regarded by the courts as a usual companion
to physical pain and the difficulty of distinguishing the two has

been deemed a reason for allowing damages for mental suffering.3 0
Justice Kelly, specially concurring in Goertz v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Company,31 said:
It might .. .be said that it is fruitless to search for any norm to
measure compensation for intangible painful consequences of a
wrongful injury. On the other hand there must be a norm, otherwise how can the rule state that a verdict may not be set aside as
excessive unless it be "wholly unwarranted," "palpably excessive"
2
and so on. The very words used in the rule presuppose a norm.
Thus the per diem method of computing pain and suffering in

personal injury litigation has evolved, and with it its pendent
controversies.
In the trial of a personal injury case, unlike a trial in a
court of equity, the verdict can only be written in terms of
dollars and cents. It cannot be amended periodically to meet
the plaintiff's needs, "[lt is one lump sum for all times. 3
25 Comment, Uncertain Damages, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 180 (1910); See
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (I.P.I.) No. 30.05 which provides: "The
pain and suffering experienced [and reasonably certain to be experienced in
the future] as a result of the injuries," as an element of damages.
26 C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES, §27 (1935).
27 Id.
App. 332, 350, 23 N.E.2d
28 McDaniels v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 302 Ill.
785, 792 (1939) ; See, Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Thil, 228 Ill. 233, 241,
81 N.E. 857, 860 (1907).
29 Webster defines "pain as mental distress, anxiety, grief, anguish,
and does not necessarily mean physical pain. See, Robertson v. Craver, 88
Iowa 380, 390, 55 N.W. 492, 495 (1893).
In a personal injury action, the defendant was not entitled to have the
terms "pain" and "suffering" so restricted as to exclude the mental phase in
an instruction authorizing damages for past and future pain and suffering.
"Pain" was construed to mean an acute discomfort of body or mind, and
"suffering," the enduring of pain or distress. Prettyman v. Topkis, 39 Del.

568, 572, 3 A.2d 708, 712 (1938).

30 See Bonelli v. Branciere, 127 Miss. 556, 90 So. 245 (1922).
3119 I1. App. 2d 261,153 N.E.2d 486 (1958).
32 Id. at 275-76, 153 N.E.2d at 494.

33 Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate Award, 22 Miss. L.

J. 284, 308 (1951).
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Thus it behooves the plaintiff's attorney to do a complete job
at the trial court level attaining for his client all he is legally
entitled to. This means one must spell out to the jury exactly
what comprises the amount of damages to be asked for.3 Melvin
M. Belli gave an illustration of this technique saying:
You must start at th6 beginning and show that pain is a continuous
thing, second by second, minute by minute, hour by hour, year after
year for thirty years. You must interpret one second, one minute,
one hour, one year of pain and suffering into dollars and cents and
then multiply to your absolute figure to show how you have achieved
your result .

. . .

5

A typical mathematical formula can be exemplified by respondent counsel's argument in Johnson v. Brown, 6 "[n] ow,
what is it worth. . . .to have the traction pin pushed through
your leg. . . . Would ten cents a minute be unfair? That

would be six dollars an hour.

3

7

The effectiveness of using this

84M.at 318.
Id.

85
36

75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959).

37Id. at 446, 345 P.2d at 758-59 (1959).

Another effective per diem
argument can be illustrated as follows:
Let's take Pat, my client, down to the waterfront. He sees Mike,
an old friend . . . and says, "Mike, I've got a job for you . .. You're

not going to have to work any more for the rest of your life and the
best part of this job is . . .you'll never lose it ... You don't have to do
any work ... All you have to do is to trade me your good back for my
bad one and I'll give you five dollars a day for the rest of your life. Do
you know what five dollars a day for the rest of your life is? Why
that's $60,000! Of course, I realize that you are not going to be able to
do any walking, or any swimming, or driving an automobile, or be able
it sit in a movie picture show; you're going to have excruciating pain
and suffering with this job, thirty-one million seconds a year and once
you take it on, you'll never be able to relieve yourself of this, but you
get $60,000 !"

Address by Melvin M. Belli, supra note 7 at 319.
Note the actual chart which appeared in Ratner:
Wendell Arrington

Age 43

Expectancy 28.8 years
To Date

Medical Ezpense
Lee Memorial Hosp.
North Shore Hosp.

St. Francis Hosp.
Mercy Hosp.

Dr. Warnock

Dr. Quillian Jones
Dr. Russell
Dr. Zaydon
Drs. Leslie & Small (anesthetists)
Dr. Ferrer (anesthetist)
Dr. Fusco (anesthetist)
Nurse Early
Nurse Skelton
Wheatley Brace Company
Drugs & Medicines
Pain and Suffering

12/8/55-1/30/58 - 783 days @ 15.

PhysicalDisability and Inability to Lead a Normal Life
12/8/55 - 1/30/58 - 783 days @ 5.

$1,211.15
20.00

1,227.42
1,102.30

575.00

240.00
1,290.00
1,175.00
292.50
172.50
30.00
661.30
721.30
55.00
470.72
9,244.19

11,745.00
3,915.00
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type of argument coupled with the visual stimuli of a black-

board or chart can be readily appreciated.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

In Ratner v. Arrington," the leading case in this area, the

court was careful not to foreclose the question of using a unitof-time argument for evaluating pain and suffering:
[R]ecent holdings, for and against the allowance of such arguments, are not grounded on reasons of sufficient force to compel
the decision either way. The ultimate course of judicial opinion
on the point is not yet discernible. 39

In 1958, the decision of Botta v. Brunner"' pointed out that
the blackboard technique of computing a per diem formula is,

in reality, an attempt to interject testimony which a witness
would not otherwise be permitted to give. The court quoted
from several old Pennsylvania cases which likewise denounced

the mathematical formula saying that:
In cases where the damages are unliquidated and incapable of
measurement by a mathematical standard, statements by plaintiff's

counsel as to the amount claimed or expected are not to be sanctioned, because they tend to instill in the minds of the jury impres41
sions not founded upon the evidence.

Further the court continued, "[S]tatements calling attention to
claims and amounts not supported by the evidence constitute a
suggestion to the jury 'which in their minds takes the place of
evidence.'

"42

The court went on to point out that
would be incompetent to estimate pain on
diem basis and therefore plaintiff's counsel
are likewise incompetent.43 In conclusion,

an expert witness
a per hour or per
and his blackboard
the court said the

Loss of Earnings
111 weeks @ 125.

13,875.00
Future

10,220 days
28 years
Medical Expense
Pain and Suffering
10,220 days
PhysicalDisability and Inability to Lead a Normal Life
10,220 days @ 3.
Loss of Earning Capacity
To age 70
27 years

38,779.00
500.00
10,220.00
30,660.00
162,000.00
242,159.00

111 So.2d 82,86 (Fla. App. 1959).
38 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
39 Id. at 89. See Rudolph, Trial-Argument of Counsel Use of a
Formula Not Based on Evidence, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 454 (1962), where the
court said: "Obviously, the question is still an open one and it appears that
it will remain open ... the end is not near." Id. at 455.
40 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
41 Id. at 98, 138 A.2d at 722.
42 Id.
43 Id.
See dissent in Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221
Miss. 403, 73 So.2d 144 (1954).
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best test that the law has provided for juries to determine the
amount to be awarded for pain and suffering is "their enlightened conscience.""
Then, one year later, Ratrer v. Arrington- was decided by
a Florida court of appeals, which held it admissible to use a
per diem argument portrayed on a blackboard as a measurement of pain and suffering."6 The reasons given in support of
the formula were:
1. The very absence of a fixed standard for the monetary
measurement of pain and suffering is reason for allowing wide
latitude in arguing these damages47 and counsel should48 be allowed to draw all proper inferences from the evidence.
2. The trier of facts should be guided by some reasonable
pain and sufand practical considerations since an award for
9
guess.
mere
a
upon
depend
fering should not
3. The per diem arguments are not evidence but are
merely illustrative50 and the jury is free to weigh the argument
and pass on its credibility. 51
The trend seemed to be in favor of the per diem formula
until Crum v. Ward in 1961, where it was said that an argument
based on a mathematical formula or fixed time basis suggesting
a monetary value for pain and suffering was error.52 Citing
Botta, the court said:
For hundreds of years, the measure of damages for pain and suffering following in the wake of a personal injury has been "fair
and reasonable compensation." The general standard was adopted
that a more specific or definibecause of universal acknowledgment
53
tive one is impossible.
The court concluded that the mathematical formula argument
is based wholly on speculation, or imaginary inferences, not
facts, which could not be
supported by facts, but by supposed
54
received as evidence if offered.
A survey of the case law would not be complete without
mention of the Illinois case of Caley v. Manicke. 5 At the trial
court level the defendant's motion that the plaintiff's attorney
44Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 103, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (1958).
4.1111

46Id.
47 Id.

So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).

48McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So.2d 315 (1958).
49Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 941 (1956).
. Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30
(1956).
51 J.D. Wright & Son Truckline v.Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
52146 W. Va. 421,122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).
58 Id. at 429 122 S.E.2d at 23.
5 Crum v.*ard, 146 W. Va. 421,122 S.E.2d 18 (1961).
5 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
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could not portray on a chart an hourly, daily, weekly, monthly
or yearly basis for computing pain and suffering, was denied
and this was affirmed by the appellate court. 6 The appellate
court, reasoning syllogistically, cited the old Illinois case of
Graham v. Mattoon City Railway Company5 7 which held that
counsel, in his argument to the jury, can comment as to what
he considers fair compensation for the injuries received.59 From
here the court reasoned that since it was proper argument to
point out that pain and suffering are compensated for in money,
it cannot be improper to discuss the components of the total.
The fact that such argument might be more persuasive than
arguing a gross amount is no reason to forbid its use, and surely
the portrayal of such in arithmetic terms on a chart cannot
make what was once valid invalid.5 9 Three months later the
First District Appellate Court handed down the opinion in
Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company ° which was
in accord with Caley. Jensen was another well reasoned opinion
which permitted plaintiff's counsel to argue to the jury an
hourly rate for the evaluation of such pain and suffering.61
Citing Caley in approval, they went on to say: "[W]e are inclined to regard this use of the per diem argument as a more
adequate resolution of the problem and clearly less speculative
'2
than the 'by gosh and by golly' approach."
It appeared as if Illinois law was in favor of such tactics
until, by certificate of importance, Caley became a case of first
impression for the Illinois Supreme Court6 3 The majority of the
court held that this was improper argument and reversed the
judgment. They felt that pain and suffering have no commercial value to which a jury can refer in determining what
56 29 Ill.
App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961).

57 234 Ill.
483, 84 N.E. 1070 (1908).
58 The court in Graham v. Mattoon City Ry. Co. said:
rT]hat the sum of $10,000 which he asked you to give him in his declaration is what he should fairly have, gentlemen of the jury. The objection made to these remarks is that they refer to the amount claimed in
the declaration. We do not think that there is any valid objection to
counsel, in argument, telling the jury what, under the evidence, counsel
considers a fair compensation for the injuries received.
Id. at 491, 84 N.E. at 1073.
59 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209, where the court in summary said:
In the first place, such an argument can suggest valid considerations for
rendering the abstraction of pain and suffering comprehensible for concrete translation into dollars; Secondly, the argument is logically suggested by the evidence when read in context with the monetary determination that must be made; Thirdly, this line of argument falls within
hitherto accepted bounds of advocacy and it is not apparent to us
where it now o'er leaps them.
Id. at 340, 173 N.E.2d at 217.
6031 Ill. Aup. 2d 198, 175 N.E.2d 564 (1961).
61 Id.
62

63

Id. at 221, 175 N.E.2d at 576.
24 I1. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
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monetary allowance should be given to a plaintiff.

Thus the

-130

jury must be left to its own judgment and conscience since
"[i]urors are as familiar with pain and suffering and with money
as are counsel.

' 64

The court did point out, however, that they

had no objection to the method of preparing the chart as illustration of counsel's argument, "except for those portions
reflecting the mathematical formula for pain and suffering." 65
It is interesting to note, however, that in the dissenting opin-

ion the majority is reminded, academically, of the tradition in Illinois of permitting counsel to suggest a total monetary award for
pain and suffering, 66 and that there is no logical basis in permitting counsel to suggest a total monetary value of pain and
suffering, while prohibiting him from explaining to the jury his
reasoning in arriving at such a figure. 7 In 1964, in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,68 the dissent's reasoning in Caley v. Manicke,69 was reinforced. In Darling,the plaintiff's counsel, with the use of an easel, included reference to computation for immediate suffering and future pain in his closing

argument. The court, not specifically making reference to the
mathematical formula, held that such a chart was proper as a
mere illustration of counsel's argument since "it showed the
64

Id.

at 393, 182 N.E.2d at 209.

65 Id. at 394, 182 N.E.2d at 209.

66 Graham v. Mattoon City R.R., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N.E. 1070 (1908), the

argument which defendant contended was prejudicial was:
We say to you, gentlemen of the jury, and repeat it again, that the
evidence shows a case of a man who in sound health weighed three hundred pounds, an active man, whom this company trusted and employed; that this man is permanently injured; that the sum of $10,000
which he asked you to give him in his declaration is what he should
fairly have, gentlemen of the jury.
Id. at 491, 84 N.E. at 1073.
67 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206, where dissent says:
It appears anomalous that, according to the majority opinion, plaintiff's
counsel may, without error, place upon a chart before the jury his
estimate of the monetary value of the nature of the injury, ($10,000)
the future pain, ($8,760); the hospital and medical bills, ($1,288.90)
the lost earnings, ($5,312) ; and the permanency of the injury, ($8,000)
for a total of $33,360.90. He may also suggest a total monetary value
of $50,140.90 as just compensation for the injury. However, when he
suggests that $16,780.10 is a reasonable figure for 11,680 hours and 510
days of pain, this court feels compelled to reverse .
Id. at 398, 182 N.E.2d at 211.
In accord Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d
575 (1960).
Judge Crockett, concurring, said:
If he (plaintiff's counsel] can talk about it [amount of damages sought
for pain and suffering] at all and mention some gross figure, which it
has always been assumed he could do, it would seem no more harmful to
invite the jury's attention to a process of analysis and reasoning with
respect thereto based upon the time involved and reasonable compensation therefor.
Id. at 28, 354 P.2d at 578.
68 50 Ill.
App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964).
69 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
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jury visually nothing more than the jury heard orally."70 The
per diem argument has been rejected by the Illinois Supreme
Court on first impression, but the dissent in that case and other
Illinois Appellate Court opinions seems to hint that the issue is
not yet foreclosed.
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF UNIT-OF-TIME FORMULA

The split authority on the issue of using a mathematical
formula for computing pain and suffering has sparked much
criticism. The attorney who desires to take advantage of such
a formula must be aware of the arguments advanced against its
use, as well as the corresponding answers posed by its advocates.

The first argument against the formula is that there is no
evidentiary basis for connecting pain and suffering into monetary terms since it has no market value.hl The lack of such mar-

ket value, however, does not deprive the plaintiff of the right to

72
tell the jury what he estimates proper compensation to be.
Counsel's formula is merely a comment on the evidence in the
record concerning pain and suffering 73 or a reasonable inference

from such evidence.7 4 Professor Wigmore has said that, "[s]o
long as the law gives compensation in the shape of money, there
' 75
in an inconsistence in excluding estimates in money.
It is also contended that the formula for computing pain and
suffering is an invasion of the domain of the jury.76 If the jury
has the final word and the attorney is merely commenting on the
evidence, there is no usurpation of the jury's function. The jurors are ultimately the ones who weigh the comments of counsel
and are free to disregard them as they see fit. 77 Furthermore,
there is no harm in giving a reasonable and practical standard to

guide the judge or jury in their determination of an award. This
Il1. App. 2d 253, 336, 200 N.E.2d 149, 190 (1964).
Gorczyca v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A.2d
589 (1954) ; Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958) ; Stassun v.
Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 A. 111 (1936).
72 Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.2d
144 (1954).
" 3J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
74 See Comment, Damages - Pain and Suffering - Counsel's Argument
to Jury re Amount of Award Held Improper, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958).
75 7 J. WIGMoRE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §1944 (3d ed. 1940).
76 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958),
where the court
said:
Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment and inconvenience, and
they also know the nature of money. Their problem of equating the
two to afford reasonable and just compensation calls for a high order
of human judgment, and the law has provided no better yardstick for
their guidance than their enlightened conscience. Their problem is not
one of mathematical calculation but involves an exercise of their sound
judgment of what is fair and right.
Id. at 103, 138 A.2d at 725.
7T J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950).
70 50

71
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is preferable to leaving them to a "blind guess or the pulling of a

78
figure out of the air.1
The fact that the formula may carry too much weight with
the jury and may be considered as evidence79 has also been raised
as an argument by opponents of the formula. The answer to this
argument is simply that a prejudicial effect, if any, caused by
this technique of evaluating pain and suffering, can be eradi-

cated or prevented by cautionary instructions given by the

judge.80 Some courts have made it a requirement that the mathematical formula be accompanied by a cautionary instruction to
the jury to the effect that the argument is not evidence and that
they alone must determine the proper verdict."'
It is also argued that each individual has a different reaction
to a particular injury, a different "threshold of pain,182 which
the formula fails to recognize. This argument, however, would
be equally applicable to any method of computing pain and suffering, whether mathematical or otherwise. With this contention, there is usually coupled the argument that such formulas
include the connotation of "disability," "inability to lead a normal life," "humiliation and embarrassment," as well as "pain and
suffering." 8 This, it is contended, confuses the jury and results in an over-estimation of the damages. 84 But this argument
is one attacking the practicality of the formula's application

rather than a condemnation of the method itself. If such overlapping of terms does in fact exist, and an over-estimation by the
jury is a possible result, it is the job of the defense attorney to

prevent it.8

An attack on this method by an ineffective defense

Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4, 11 (6th Cir. 1956).
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
80 See Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.
2d 144 (1954) ; Vaughan v. Magee, 218 F. 630 (3d Cir. 1914).
See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (I.P.I.) No. 1.01 (5) which provides:
Arguments, statements, and remarks of counsel are intended to
help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law, but are
not evidence. If any argument, statement, or remark has no basis in the
evidence, then you should disregard that argument, statement or remark.
81Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 177 A.2d 701 (Md. App.
1962).
82 See Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 154 A. 582 (1931).
83 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
84Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Braddock, 96 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957). In the dissenting opinion it was pointed
out that the verdict was excessive due to the overlapping of terms used by
plaintiff on a placard. A portion of the placard appeared as follows:
Pain and Suffering
20,440 days
20,440
Humiliation and Embarrassment
20,440 days
40,880
Inability to Lead a Normal Life
20,440 days
40,880
Loss of Earning Capacity
5500 x 50% x 56
121,000
Total
248,439
78

79

Id. at 129.

The minority felt that at least some of the elements of damages were included more than once.
85 Sessions, The Trial Lawyer of the Future, 35 TENN. L. REv. 442
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attorney would be merely an attack on the practical results of
his own inactions.
The defense attorneys say that such argument puts them in
the position of having to rebut an argument which has no basis
in evidence.86 They contend that if counsel attempts to argue
a lower formula, he has in effect admitted that the law recognizes
such a method of evaluating pain and suffering. His silence, on
the other hand, might constitute a tacit approval for the argument. But counsel for the defendant could also cast doubt on the
validity of the formula by skillful illustration and criticism. He
could likewise advance arguments to keep the evaluation of the
damages reasonable and objective, urge reasons why a lower
figure should be used, and point out to the jury that plaintiff's estimate may contain overlapping items. A "sliding-scale" per
diem evaluation could also be employed which would tend to keep
the figure in proportion to the possibly diminishing future suffering and also reduce the future per diem award to present
87
values.
Finally, the argument most frequently posed is that counsel's suggestion of a mathematical formula is equivalent to the attorney giving testimony on a matter upon which testimony is not
allowed, since pain and suffering have no exact value.8 The answer to this argument seems to be that counsel's suggestions are
not, in fact, testimony or evidence, but merely an attempt to present one method by which the jury may compute a reasonable
award of damages.,"
CONCLUSION

For two decades the courts throughout the country have
been plagued with the issue of whether pain and suffering may
be portrayed by way of a mathematical formula. 9° The slow
progress in this area is partially attributable to the custom of reserving the per diem argument for summation, a stage of trial
(1968). It was said that:
The primary purpose of a trial is to ascertain the truth. The most effective means devised to achieve that purpose is by the adversary system - trial lawyers examining witnesses pursuant to established rules,
a principal working part of which machinery being what Dean Wigmore
calls the "anvil" of cross-examination. No judge and no court can effect a sufficient substitute for the competing trial lawyers in the search
for truth.
Id. at8 447. See note 3 supra.
6 See Fearon, Evidence: Use of Chart to Illustrate Per Diem Formula
for Measurement of Plainand Suffering, 16 ME. L. Rnv. 233 (1964).
87 Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956).
88
See Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
8 See Graham v. Mattoon City R.R. Co., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N.E. 1070
(1909).
9o See note 3 supra.
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where judicial reprimand is to be avoided. 91 As yet, the ultimate
course of judicial opinion is not crystallized.9 '
Possibly the unenunciated reasons for excluding the unitof-time method are the underlying philosophies that:
1. Pain and suffering should not be compensable.
2. If pain and suffering are compensable, they should be so
only to a limited degree.
3. The lay jury is not competent to evaluate conflicting
facts and theories in making an award.93
If any of these suggested reasons has validity, the solution
lies not in withholding problem-solving ideas from the jury, but
in attacking the problem more directly and less hypocritically.
The courts objecting to the use of a formula-type argument
labor under the assumption that the excessive verdicts result
from their use. Even if this rationale is sound, it overlooks the
power of the court to control the outer limits of verdicts by setting them aside for excessiveness, or inadequacy. In view of
this it is submitted that the prohibition of the use of unit-of-time
formulas involve an unwarranted restriction upon the right of
the advocate to comment on inferences drawn from the evidence.
In determining "fair and reasonable compensation" the jury must
convert pain and suffering into dollars. The court gives the jury
little or no help in performing this difficult task. Consequently
it would seem that counsel should have a wide latitude in argument.9'
The issue is a basic one: namely, how much money should be
given to plaintiff to compensate him for the experiences he has
had to endure and the changes that have been made in his life as
a result of the defendant's negligence? The term "compensation"
is used throughout the cases, but money cannot really compensate or be equivalent to the plaintiff's inability to lead a normal
life. Pain and suffering is not like "loss of bargain," on the contrary, it is unique; yet specific performance cannot be had. Few
would argue that it is less valuable than possessions that can be
bought and sold, and most would consider it more valuable, even
though its value is not easily calculated in dollars. As long as
91 Comment, Damages - Pain and Suffering - Counsel's Argument to
Jur'y re Amount of Award Held Improper, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 522 (1958).
Testing of the court's opinion at trial in a search for admissible phrasing
of a money-oriented argument will proceed slowly, since the type of

argument is customarily reserved for summation and it is obvious trial
technique to avoid judicial reprimand during this last and most persuasive address to the jury.
Id. at 526.
92 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
9 Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury9Litigation,36 DUKE L. J. 344 (1962).
4See Snyder, Trial - Damages - Counsel's Suggestion to Jury of
Formula for Pain and Suffering, 28 U. CIN. L. REv. 138 (1962).
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money is considered a "good" by our society, money should be
given the victim in an attempt to counteract his loss of something. Otherwise what is the accident victim's quid pro quo?
The pain associated with a doctor or dentist is compensated
by the arresting of an unhealthy condition. The pain accompanying childbirth is compensated by the life-proclaiming cry of a
new son or daughter. What compensation is there for the agony
suffered by the tort-feasor's innocent victim? The award of
money is, at best, only an attempt at compensation, but it is better than no attempt at all. How much money will be awarded
of course depends upon the current attitude of society as represented by a cross section thereof which is usually a jury. It was
said that:
Judges as well as jurors need some basis for calculating awards,
otherwise their decisions are apt in many cases to be unfair to
either plaintiff or defendant. Juries have nothing but their consciences to guide them. Judges may look to other cases for comparison, but in so doing
they will find themselves struggling in a
5
sea of incomparables.
The better-reasoned cases hold that the suggestion of a
mathematical formula by plaintiff's counsel is within the right of
counsel to draw inferences from the evidence in arguing damages. "Jurors are presumed to be intelligent"6 and they try to
give a fair verdict to the best of their ability.97 With the assistance of instructions, there is no reason to believe they will be
mislead into thinking counsel's arguments are evidence, nor will
they give too much weight to anything put in a formula or on a
chart.
The exclusion of a per diem argument for pain and suffering
necessarily results in a restriction upon the right and duty of
counsel to argue every phase of his case. Such would be a denial
of the right of advocacy where the techniques of persuasion are
critical to the client.98 Furthermore, the denial of analytical
argument will result in inconsistent awards 9 as well as unreal95 Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 28
(1954). See Lockwood v. Twenty-third St. Ry. Co., 15 Daly 374, 7 N.Y.
Supp. 663 (N.L. Com. Pleas 1889) where the court said:
It is difficult to estimate the damages and, as has already been said, the
best attainable criterion of the reasonableness of a verdict is its conformity to the average amount awarded by juries in cases in which
injuries of like nature and like extent have been sustained.
Id. at 375, 7 N.Y. Supp. at 664.
Almost identical language was used in Buswell v. San Francisco, 89 Cal.
App. 123, 127, 200 P.2d 115, 117 (1948).
96 Fearon, Evidence: The Use of Charts To Illustrate Per Diem Formula
for Measurement of Pain and Suffering, 16 ME. L. REv. 233, 236 (1964).
9 See note 7 supra.
98 See note 96 supra.

99 For cases recognizing the need of a reasonable uniformity in awards
for similar injuries, despite differences between plaintiffs, see Cavicchi v.
Gaiety Amusement Co., 173 So. 458 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Morris v. E. I. Du-
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istic ones. 100 On the other hand, the danger of an abuse of the
privilege, either in application or presentation, can be controlled
by the 01appellate judiciary processes to prevent injustice to either
party. 1
The enlightened view is to allow the use of blackboards and
charts in jury argument and permit the jury to see all they are
allowed to hear. 0 2 Likewise, many jurisdictions also permit
comment upon a total amount of dollars which counsel feels will
be compensable for pain and suffering. 0 a Therefore, the only
issue remaining is whether counsel can explain visually how he
arrived at such a figure to a jury who without such explanation
would be left to a "blind guess." Such a technique could only increase the utility of our adversary system.
Barton Alan Hyman

Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 139 S.W.2d 984 (1940) ; Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Black, 186 Okla. 596, 99 P.2d 891 (1940).
100 See note 96 supra.
01
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Diem Argument to the Jury, 38 N.C.L. REv. 329 (1960).
102 Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem. Hosp., 50 I1l. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149, (1964).
108 Caley v. Manicke, 24 Il. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).

